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Being Critical About Being Critical
Nicholas C. Burbules (University of Illinois, Urbana- Champaign)
Abstract
This response to “Toward a Transformative Criticality for Democratic Citizenship Education” takes a 
positive and supportive stance toward pressing the arguments forward. By focusing on the communi-
cative components of democratic citizenship education and activist pedagogy, it highlights some of 
the tensions and difficulties of actually doing this work.
This article is in response to
Sibbett, L. (2016). Toward a Transformative Criticality for Democratic Citizenship Education. 
Democracy & Education, 24(2), Article 1. Available at: http:// democracyeducationjournal.org/home/
vol24/iss2/1
You do not often find your work getting such generous and thoughtful treatment as mine receives in this essay, and I am grateful to Sibbett (2016) for 
engaging these issues and pressing the conversation further in 
some very fruitful and insightful directions. In that spirit, I want to 
build further upon this conversation, and revisit along the way 
some of my earlier work on criticality.
There were three main themes in that essay with Rupert 
Berk (Burbules & Berk, 1999). One was that the critical thinking 
and the critical pedagogy traditions each offer a valuable critical 
perspective on the other; while there are some areas of overlap, 
their real benefit is dialectical: The critical pedagogy tradition 
highlights how critical thinking analyses neglect issues of power; 
the critical thinking tradition highlights how critical pedagogy 
assumes certain political stances that, because they are unques-
tioned, can lead to a kind of indoctrination. The second concern 
was that each of these traditions is insufficiently self- critical— 
that a thoroughgoing criticality is willing to pull up its own roots 
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and to question its own elisions (as any theory or world view 
has). This produces a critical stance that is more provisional and 
less authoritative, grounded in an attitude of questioning and 
doubt rather than an assertion of a superior epistemic (or 
political) standpoint (Burbules, 1995). The third is that our 
notion of criticality includes the capacity for thinking differently, 
putting one’s self outside of any potential hegemony (of the right 
or of the left).
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In this essay, Sibbett (2016) took up some of the themes of that 
essay and developed her own conception of criticality, which she 
called “transformative criticality.” Part of the question here is how 
the educational value of promoting a critical orientation is tied to 
certain notions of citizenship and discourse in public life. Sibbett 
questioned an approach toward “democratic citizenship” grounded 
in ideas of pluralism, tolerance, and reasonable deliberation. That 
account, grounded in the liberal tradition, sees criticality as a 
means for contrasting points of view to engage one another, openly, 
with tolerance and respect, questioning one another and seeking 
understanding and consensus within a discursive style that is 
critical but reasonable. That process of engagement may entail 
conflict, difference, and rigorous disagreement, but within a 
framework of shared values and purposes: the pursuit of truth, the 
achievement of compromise, and the empathetic appreciation of 
cultural differences (Burbules & Rice, 1991). This approach 
exemplifies the virtues of a liberal democracy, Sibbett pointed out, 
and for that reason is more easily accommodated in traditional 
educational contexts.
The problem with this approach is not that it is impossible or 
wrong in its objectives. It is difficult to imagine an educational 
context that we would call educational that does not embrace aims 
like the pursuit of truth, the achievement of compromise, or the 
empathetic appreciation of cultural differences. The problem is 
that in conditions of unequal power or cultural dominance, the 
reasonable rules of the game for the pursuit of these aims are felt 
and experienced differently by some participants; what might look 
like an uncoerced consensus or agreement might in fact be built 
upon exclusions that do not accommodate certain voices and 
points of view because they cannot be expressed within the rules of 
that game. Everyone who speaks and participates may be satisfied, 
but the problem is for those who do not. So, we need a critical 
orientation that can recognize, question, and give voice to those 
exclusions.
Sibbett’s (2016) alternative is based upon three key ideas. One, 
adapted from Apple, is a “decentered unity,” a coalescence around 
an idea of common good that balances the values of respecting 
difference and of solidarity. It is “decentered” because it is not built 
around a priori principles and “not reducible to one understand-
ing.” The second, drawing from Westheimer and Kahne, is the idea 
of “participatory and justice- oriented citizenship,” participatory 
because it involves actual engagement with government and 
community organizations directed toward “accomplishing collec-
tive tasks,” and justice- oriented because it grows out of a recogni-
tion and critique of “systems and structures that reproduce patterns 
of injustice.” The third grows out of Sibbett’s own conception of 
wholeheartedness, an effort to reconcile the apparent duality of 
reasonableness and fervent critique within a more wholistic, 
passionate caring that encompasses grief, outrage, and “listening 
generously,” the sentiments of despair and hope, the impulses 
toward activism and deliberation. Sibbett’s conception of transfor-
mative criticality seeks to ground the idea of critique in the condi-
tions that actually make transformative praxis possible; it strives to 
achieve a synthesis of ideas that do not always cohabit easily, 
embracing tensions rather than trying to easily resolve them, and 
keeping constantly in mind the conditions that actually enable and 
empower people toward committed action.
Does this synthesis succeed? Sibbett (2016) cited the work of 
Stitzlein (2012) in her book Teaching for Dissent as a model of the 
synthesis of critical thinking and critical pedagogy underlying the 
idea of “transformative criticality.” This line of influence is not 
entirely surprising, since Stitzlein is a former student of mine— 
though I do not mean by this to take any credit for her work and 
ideas. Sibbett identified in Stitzlein’s book parallels with the three 
key ideas of decentered unities, participatory and justice- oriented 
citizenship, and wholeheartedness that she is advocating, even 
when Stitzlein’s terminology might differ. Clearly we are talking 
about a scholarly research program here with diverse lines of 
influence and convergence.
In supporting and building on Sibbett’s argument, I want to 
emphasize the central role of communication in each of the three 
key ideas that she draws together. For me, actual processes of 
communication are the place where second- order principles of 
social and political commitment get worked out in practice, and 
our abilities to make these processes of communication work are 
essential to the success of coordinated action and understanding 
directed toward progressive change.
Habermas’s distinction of strategic communication and 
communication directed toward understanding provides a useful 
starting point (1984). Activist pedagogy, and the specific activities 
that constitute it, continually raise the question of whether the goal 
is to bring about a specific state of affairs that the pedagogue has in 
mind, and which the students are intended to believe in and work 
toward, or whether it is to enable and empower students to make 
choices, set goals, and pursue actions that may yield a range of 
possible outcomes— some of which might be quite different from 
what the pedagogue has in mind. In the first instance, “social 
justice” is a shorthand for a set of specific beliefs about how society 
ought to be organized, and the only question is how to accomplish 
it; in the second instance, the pedagogue has to be prepared for 
student choices that (may) surprise and disappoint them. Sibbett 
(2016) characterized this dilemma as the problem of avoiding 
“indoctrination,” and pedagogically that is a crucial issue. But it is 
also a question of whether the pedagogue presumes to know the 
choices others ought to make and how society should be organized. 
In one sense, this more teleological view of activism is a legacy of 
the Marxist roots of critical pedagogy, even now as it has been 
vastly complicated by considerations of race, ethnicity, gender, and 
sexuality. Marx believed there was an achievable state of commu-
nism, equality, and freedom, in which conflict would come to an 
end. On this view, transformation is the transformation from A to B, 
where B is a given endpoint. Sibbett, I believe, was trying to avoid 
that association. Habermas’s distinction, then, forces us to ask 
whether pedagogical communication, in the classroom and other 
venues, is strategic— designed to produce a particular out-
come— or more open- ended, a process aimed toward understand-
ing and choice that may yield a set of conclusions that cannot be 
predicted or determined in advance.
First, a “decentered unity,” as Sibbett (2016) described it, is a 
prime example of an outcome that cannot be determined in 
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advance. It is closely akin to the idea of a “third space,” an idea I 
explored at some length in a previous essay:
A third space . . . is not a “middle ground” or “merging” or “compromise” 
between the original views, but a reframing of the topic— one that may 
indeed implicitly challenge the way in which the topic is originally being 
framed. Furthermore, a third space is not necessarily a “solution” to the 
problem of disagreement or misunderstanding. Some appropriations of 
the term want to domesticate the notion, turn it into another way in 
which “bad” conflicts can be made to go away, or work out nicely. But I 
would insist that third spaces are problematic and problematizing 
moments, risky and as prone to chaos, or even heightened conflict, as to 
producing new understandings. Viewing third space as a mutually 
established, shared discursive zone also reveals its provisional character, 
bounded in circumstance, space, and time. Sometimes discursive third 
spaces are linked to actual border zones— a room, a street, a table, an 
open plain, where contending parties meet— and sometimes also are 
linked to specific practices, even rituals, that establish an un- usual place 
and time . . . Most important, third spaces, while requiring the 
participation of multiple actors from different discursive frames (and in 
this sense having a consensual character) do not necessarily yield 
anything that can be called in a simple way consent, agreement, or 
understanding. Conflicts which preceded the encounter may still exist, 
perhaps even with a heightened and more vivid impact. Third spaces do 
not necessarily make conflicts go away— that is not their primary 
purpose and value. They become a potential framework in which to 
recognize and discuss those conflicts with fresh terms and perspectives, 
and in that possibly to understand them better . . . It requires a tolerance 
for a certain kind of friction, risk, and uncertainty. It requires a 
judgment about who is worth pursuing such understandings with, and 
who is not. (Burbules, 2006, 114- 115)
A third space is a communicative achievement: situated and 
contingent, accomplished by actual people in actual circumstances. 
It is not generalizable to other people or other circumstances. Like 
other aspects of Sibbett’s arguments, it tries to get past dualities of 
optimism and pessimism, to pragmatic possibilities and hope (this 
is another point of contact with Stitzlein’s work). It presses past 
Habermas’s idea of communication aimed toward agreement or 
understanding to recognize that the outcomes of communication 
can have a variety of forms, some of them difficult and unstable, 
that are not necessarily convergent.
Second, the idea of “participatory and justice- oriented 
citizenship” also has a communicative core. Sibbett (2016) cited the 
work of Sanders (1997), “Against Deliberation,” which argued that 
in conditions of unequal power, debate cannot always be reason-
able. In Sanders’ view, critique may sometimes become intemperate 
(p. 6). My avenue into this same idea comes from Young, who 
distinguishes deliberative and activist speech Young, I. M. (2001). 
Both are valuable in a democracy, but the rules of each are funda-
mentally different. Deliberation is a communicative stance geared 
toward speaking, listening, and working through a problem. 
Activist speech foregrounds conflict; it is oppositional and does not 
need (or want) a response. One might say that deliberation is 
speaking with; activist speech is speaking to, perhaps at, or even 
against. In these twin notions, we see contrasting ideas of participa-
tory citizenship, each perhaps suited to a particular set of circum-
stances, but not consistent with each other. To oversimplify: The 
deliberative approach prevails when you have a seat at the table; the 
activist approach when you are excluded from the table and want to 
challenge who is there, and why you are not. Sibbett sought to 
cultivate “both engagement and dissent,” which seems right to me, 
but this perhaps underestimates the very different communicative 
rules, roles, and capabilities that support each of those valued goals. 
The kinds of people who are communicatively good at one, or more 
motivated to pursue one, may not be very good at the other.
The question of “justice- oriented” citizenship raises again 
the contrast between teleological and process- oriented concep-
tions of justice: whether one thinks one knows what an ideal 
society should look like, or whether one is committed to paths of 
engagement, exploration, and experimentation that may result in 
a range of possible (and unpredictable) futures. The characteriza-
tion of justice- oriented citizenship provided by Sibbett (2016) is 
mainly negative: she cites Westheimer and Kahne’s appeal to 
teach young people to “question, debate, and change established 
systems and structures that reproduce patterns of injustice over 
time” (p. 8). That helps us in understanding the critical dimension 
of challenging those systems and structures but not in identifying 
where they should be changed, overthrown, or replaced with 
something better. What constitutes “better”? And who decides? 
Another legacy of the Marxist tradition is a dichotomous view of 
conflict: Group A is always right, and group B is always to blame; 
all conflict is the result of X, and if you can just transform or 
overthrow X, everything will be better. Many left critical positions 
still derive from this mode of thinking, and their conception of 
transformation is accordingly thin. The sources of human conflict 
and injustice are in fact multiple and cannot be traced to just one 
source. When one looks at things this way, there cannot be simple 
dualities of oppressor and oppressed, and one’s theory of social 
change or transformation cannot be reduced to simply taking 
sides in advancing one group’s interests over another’s or over-
throwing one particular system and replacing it with something 
else. What we need, I would suggest broadly, is an ongoing, 
iterative process of critique, reform, and self- questioning. There is 
no utopian end state.
Dissent and activist speech are essential dimensions of 
protest and agitating for change, and they often depend on implicit 
assumptions about directions for that change; but insofar as they 
arise from visceral reactions of anger or outrage at an existing 
injustice, they can be unreliable guides for positive action. In my 
experience, they often yield the political response of demands and 
assertion of principles as absolutes, which may have an invigorat-
ing political force but are not very compatible with the deliberative 
approach that is necessary to actually analyze problems, propose 
policies, and work toward acceptable compromises in the face of 
inevitable differences of opinion. Here again, focusing on the 
communicative dimension of these speech acts helps clarify the 
deep tensions between these political stances.
Third, I greatly appreciate Sibbett’s (2016) discussion of 
wholeheartedness, because it helps to draw our attention to the 
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inescapable emotional dimension of political communication and 
political action. One of the shortcomings of Habermas’s theory is 
that he conceives communication in almost purely cognitive terms. 
But language is not just for the expression of belief or the assertion 
of normative claims. Language, especially political language, is 
spoken by people with feelings, hopes, and fears. When political 
communication takes the form of “impassioned outcry” or 
expresses “grief, outrage, and despair” (Sibbett, 2016, p. 8) its moral 
force derives not only from its overt content but from the emo-
tional impulses that give rise to it. Before there is critique, often, 
there is that raw prereflective sense of wrong: Sometimes even the 
simple, loud utterance of “No!” It is crucial to recognize, as Sibbett’s 
account does, that this level of emotion and feeling is often 
inseparable from the “unwavering commitment” (p. 8) that 
supports sustained effort to pursue change beyond the articulation 
of critique.
I admire all of this. But I want to, again, suggest a deeper 
tension and difficulty. As I mentioned, visceral outrage does not 
help us see, and may in fact interfere with, the formulation of a 
positive alternative and a way of realistically achieving it. Part of 
nonindoctrinatory citizenship education of the sort Sibbett (2016) 
envisioned is to highlight for students the history of idealism gone 
awry, of good intentions that end up yielding their opposite, of 
absolutisms that end up creating their own oppressions, or of 
Berlinian conflicts between values that force hard choices and 
situated, workable compromises (Berlin, 2013). Deliberation, in 
other words, is not the opposite of activist speech: It is the objective 
toward which activist speech or dissent must be directed. You can 
demand a seat at the table, but once you are at the table, the 
language of demands does not work anymore. Within the delibera-
tive frame you can challenge the terms of discussion, the positions 
of unequal power, or the privileging of certain ways of communi-
cating. But you cannot always and only be doing that, or else 
participation is pointless. Levinson (2002) wrote:
Like the deliberative democrat, the activist is looking for a way to shift 
the focus from the interests of the powerful to the interests of the 
broader polity. Unlike the deliberative democrat, however, the activist 
does not think that the interests of the politically impoverished are 
likely to make their way into deliberative fora unless the 
disempowered use activist strategies to disrupt the way particular 
debates are framed. In short, the work of activists lays the groundwork 
for genuinely democratic deliberation. Far from derailing deliberative 
democracy, activism keeps it in on track. (p. 59)
Reasonableness is not the foil against which to contrast some 
other mode of communicative engagement, nor is it the a priori 
privilege of certain people or groups: It is the difficult, contingent 
social practice of pursuing the solutions to certain problems in a 
way that respects differences and critically acknowledges the forces 
of context and history, without giving in to them. Reasonableness 
is what we work toward— what we must work toward— in any 
context that can legitimately be called educational.
That final point, I hope, provides the coda for this discussion, 
because Sibbett’s (2016) work, and Stitzlein’s (2012), and my own, 
all operate within a space of not only analyzing the features of 
critical politics and citizenship writ large but of specifically caring 
about what these mean in the context of an education that prepares 
people for those activities. An activist pedagogy that is not clear 
about its educational goals may become indoctrinatory. An activist 
pedagogy that focuses only on the capacity for critique and not on 
the capacities and dispositions for positive, transformative action 
may leave students angry but futile. An activist pedagogy that 
neglects the institutional and other arenas in which citizenship 
actually happens will not provide students with the skills and 
understandings to be effective agents of change. And, as I have 
argued here, an activist pedagogy that overemphasizes specific 
teleologies threatens to produce just a different kind of absolutism 
and intolerance.1
If this is right, then we can open up a new set of questions— 
some of them empirical questions— about what sorts of educa-
tional experiences will provide students with these capacities and 
dispositions. Age and developmental readiness will be factors, as 
will the background and characteristics of different kinds of 
students from different backgrounds. An approach, for example, 
may be indoctrinatory when pursued with very young students but 
not so with more mature learners. Here and in many other contexts 
I have challenged the tendency of educators to seek the one 
approach, the new alternative or innovation, that will transform 
the classroom and energize the learning experience for all students. 
Unfortunately, progressive educators have often been just as 
susceptible to this illusory pursuit of “one best system” as the 
technocrats or normalizers they decry. If there is anything we 
should have learned it is that no one approach works for all 
students, for all needs and interests, for all learning styles, for all 
ages, for all contexts. There is no approach certain to succeed, and 
there is no approach that will not have some detrimental effects, for 
some students, at the same time that it is benefitting others 
(Burbules, 1990). Our choices, then, must also be about balancing, 
managing tensions, and working over time to revise and improve 
our efforts as we learn from our mistakes and failures.
And these, for me, are not only good principles for educators 
– they are good principles for thinking about politics as well.
Notes
1. I explore some of these questions further in my introduction to Boler’s 
important book, Dialogue in Education: Troubling Speech, Disturbing 
Silence.
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